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The Conflict of Laws and the Extraterritorial
Application of the Sherman Act
I. INTRODUCTION
T HE FORMER Assistant United States Attorney General, Richard
McLaren, recently summarized the United States policy on the
extraterritorial application of its antitrust laws. He stated that:
The role that antitrust and competition policy play in American
foreign commerce - exports as well as imports - is a necessary
one. Antitrust enforcement cannot ignore foreign commerce, be-
cause national boundaries have lost much of their relevance to busi-
ness reality. Our enforcement efforts must be extended to unduly
restrictive activities outside our borders whenever - but only to
the extent that - U.S. Commerce is affected, whether immediately
or prospectively. 1
As will be seen, this expression of the role the United States
antitrust laws should play in international transactions is clearly
supported by the case law. With few exceptions the courts have not
had difficulty in applying the Sherman Act to conduct which has
occurred outside the United States regardless of the actual or po-
tential conflict of laws problems.
The justification for the extraterritorial application of the anti-
trust laws can be found in the broad and general language of the
Sherman Act. For example, section 1 declares that "[e]very contract,
combination ... in restraint of trade or commerce among the several
States, or with foreign nations .. .[is] illegal .... ."2 Thus the
Sherman Act3 has been applied extraterritorally where all the pro-
hibited conduct occurred in foreign States, or where foreign laws or
courts have prevented or might prevent the execution of a United
States court's order. In some cases the above action has percipitrated
1 Address by Richard McLaren before the American Society of Int'l Law, Williams-
burg, Va., Oct. 16, 1970.
2 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970) (emphasis added). Section 2 provides that: "Every person
who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other
person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the several
States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor ...." Id. § 2.
3 This Note will cover only the Sherman Act and will not discuss the extraterritorial
application of the Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 13 (1970) (price discrimina-
tion); Clayton 3, 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1970) (exclusive dealing and tie-ins); Clayton 7,
15 U.S.C. § 18 (1970) (antimerger); Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act,
15 U.S.C. § 45 (1970) (unfair and deceptive trade practices).
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harsh diplomatic protests and caused the foreign States to enact
legislation to protect their nationals.
Even though many States have enacted some form of trade regu-
lation,4 when compared to the Sherman Act, most of the statutes
have been restrained in both their language and application. For
example, the application of the Belgian antitrust law "is limited to
exercise - 'within the territory of the Kingdom' - of a prohibited
degree of dominance over supply, price or quality."5  In Great
Britain trade restrictions, which are imposed in good faith to protect
legitimate trade interests, even though harmful to other British com-
mercial interests, are still lawful.' There are, however, several States
whose antitrust laws have been patterned after those of the United
States and are therefore relatively comprehensive.' Even so, the
Sherman Act, with its broad language, is more expansive in its
domestic and international application than any foreign trade regu-
lation statutes.8
II. THE EARLY CASE LAW DEVELOPMENT
The first time the Supreme Court fully considered the extra-
territorial application of the Sherman Act was in American Banana
Co. v. United Fruit Co.' The American Banana Co. brought a pri-
vate treble damage action charging United Fruit with monopolizing
and restraining the banana trade. Specifically, American Banana
alleged that United Fruit had influenced the governments of Costa
4 See, e.g., Belgium's Trade Regulation Law of May 27, 1960; France's Price Ordi-
nance Act of June 30, 1945; Great Britain's Economic Competition Act of June 28,
1956; Mexico's Trade Regulation Law of August 25, 1934.
5 COMMON MARKET AND AMERICAN ANTITRUST 109 (J. Rahl ed. 1970). Under
the Belgium law, an antitrust court probably could require the production of documents
located in other States but so far this has not happened and probably will not. See del
Marmol & Fontaine, Protection Against the Abuse of Economic Power in Belgium: The
Law of May 27, 1960, 109 U. PA. L. REv. 922, 931 (1961). However, United States
courts have not been reluctant to require such production. See section IV. infra.
6 Restrictive Trade Practices Act, 4 & 5 Eliz. 2, c. 68 (1956). See also Haight,
International Law and Extraterritorial Application of the Antitrust Laws, 63 YALE L. J.
639, 645 (1954).
7 Germany's Act Against Restraints of Competition of July 27, 1957; [1957) 1
BGBI 1081; Japan's Antimonopoly Law of April 14, 1947, in 2 EHS No. 2270. The
Japanese Act "was extravagantly endorsed by the U.S. occupation forces as a charter for
the economic future of Japan." Ariga & Rieke, The Antimonopoly Law of Japan and
its Enforcement, 39 WASH. L. REv. 437 (1964). See also Matsushita & Hildebrand,
Antimonopoly Law of Japan - Relating to International Business Transactions 4 CASE
W. RES. INT'L L. 124 (1972).
8 For example, Richard McLaren has observed that "[t)oday, German antitrust pol-
icy ranks among the most vigorous outside the United States .. " McLaren, supra note 1.
9213 U.S. 347 (1909).
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Rica and Panama to prevent American Banana from building a rail-
road from its plantation to a nearby port. Then United Fruit per-
suaded Costa Rica to seize the plantation which was eventually sold
to United Fruit.
The Court held that these facts did not state a cause of action.
the situs of the act before characterizing such act as lawful or unlaw-
ful. The rationale is that it would be unjust to the actor, would
conflict with the sovereignty of the foreign States, and would be con-
trary to the notions of comity for the United States to apply its laws
in such circumstances." Since the "seizure" of the plantation was in
effect ratified by Costa Rica, American Banana was also barred from
recovery based on the Act of State doctrine.' 2
In subsequent cases the courts have so limited the broad ratio-
nales of American Banana that today little of its substance remains."
American Banana had adopted a "strict territorial" approach which
required that jurisdiction be determined by reference to the place
where the act was committed. 14  However, these cases have sub-
sequently abandoned this approach in favor of the "objective ter-
ritorial" principle of legislative jurisdiction. 5 In United States v.
1o Id. at 357. Even though United Fruit's actions were objectionable, "they were
not torts by the laws of the place (Panama or Costa Rical and therefore were not torts at
all . I..." Id.
11 Id. at 356. See note 51 infra & accompanying text, where the British court did
"resent" the assertion of extraterritorial antitrust jurisdiction by an American Court and
consequently refused to give effect to its decree.
12 In Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250 (1897), the Supreme Court first held
"the courts of one country will not sit in judgment on the acts of the government of an-
other done within its own territory." Id. at 252. This doctrine was reaffirmed in Banco
Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 416-18 (1964). Congress attempted to
overrule the Sabbatino case by enacting the so-called Sabbatino Amendment which would
require the courts to generally accept jurisdiction even though the Act of State doctrine
would have applied. See 22 U.S.C. § 2370(e) (2) (1970). For the most part, the
courts have either ignored or avoided the application of the amendment and the Act of
State doctrine is still very much alive today. See Occidental Petroleum Corp. v. Butts
Gas & Oil Co., 331 F. Supp. 92, 108-13 (C.D. Cal. 1971). See also Mazaroff, An
Evolution of the Sabbatino Amendment as a Legislative Guardian of American Private
Investment Abroad, 37 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 788 (1969).
13 About all that is left of American Banana is the Act of State doctrine. See Steele
v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280, 288 (1952); Fugate, Antitrust Jurisdiction and
Foreign Sovereignty, 49 VA. L. REv., 925, 930-32 (1963).
14 See Harvard Research on International Law: Jurisdiction with Respect to Crime,
29 AM. J. INT'L L. 435 (supp. 1935).
5 For example, see Strassheim v. Daily, 221 U.S. 280, 285 (1911), where the court
stated that:
Acts done outside a jurisdiction, but intended to produce and producing det-
rimental effects within it, justify a state in punishing the cause of the harm
[Vol. 4: 164
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Aluminum Co. of America (Alcoa),16 the objective territorial prin-
ciple was firmly established as a part of the United States antitrust
laws and the American Banana strict territorial approach was aban-
doned. In this case Alcoa was held to have violated the Sherman
Act because of an agreement entered into between a Canadian sub-
sidiary of Alcoa and several other foreign corporations. This inter-
national agreement purportedly regulated the amount of aluminum
to be produced in the foreign States. Because, as a matter of law,
this agreement could affect the level of imports of aluminum into
the United States, Judge Learned Hand found that there was a
violation of the Sherman Act. He reached this decision even though
the agreement was made and performed outside the United States
by foreign nationals.
Judge Hand first stated that the court would only examine
whether "Congress intended to impose the [extraterritorial] liability,
and whether our own Constitution permitted it to do so: . . . we
cannot look beyond our own law."" But, he also recognized that
notwithstanding the above, there are still conflict of laws limitations
to be considered.18 He then proceeded to make a statement which
he apparently considered dispositive of the conflicts issue.
as if [the actor) had been present at the time of the detrimental effect, if the
state should succeed in getting him within its powers (emphasis added).
In Unied States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106 (1911), the Court also favored
the objective territorial principle when it held that a division of markets agreement be-
tween British and American tobacco producers violated the antitrust law because of its
effect on United States commerce, even though the agreement was executed in England
and was valid there. Id. at 172. See generally W. FUGATE, FOREIGN COMMERCE AND
THE ANTITRUST LAws 20-34 (1958). For a criticism of the objective principle as it
has been applied to the Sherman Act see, Haight, supra note 6, at 643.
The next major case, United States v. Sisal Sales Corp., 274 U.S. 268 (1927), in-
volved monopolization of the Sisal twine making industry. This monopoly was obtained
through discriminatory legislation which the defendants were able to have passed by
the Mexican government. This legislation eventually forced everyone except the defen-
dants out of the sisal market. Notwithstanding this fact, the Court found that there
had been an antitrust violation because part of the plan was
entered into by parties within the United States and made effective by acts
done therein. . . . The United States complain of a violation of their laws
within their own territory by parties subject to their jurisdiction, not merely
of something done by another government at the instigation of private parties.
Id. at 276.
16 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945). The Supreme Court could not decide the Alcoa
case because they lacked a quorum, and thus the second circuit heard the case by certifi-
cation from the Supreme Court.
17 Id. at 443.
18Judge Hand observed that:
[I]t is quite true that we are not to read general words, such as those in this
Act, without regard to the limitations customarily observed by naions upon
the exercise of their powers; limitations which generally correspond to those
fixed by the "Conflict of Laws." We should not impute to Congress an in-
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[I]t is settled law ... that any state may impose liabilities, even
upon persons not within its allegience, for conduct outside its bor-
ders that has consequences within its borders which the state rep-
rehends; and these liabilities other states will ordinarily recognize.19
However, in view of possible "international complications"' "' Judge
Hand would limit extraterritorial application of the Sherman Act
to only those cases where there was (1) an effect on United States
foreign commerce, combined with (2) an intent to control such
commerce.2' Once the intent to affect commerce is shown, then the
burden shifts to the defendant to prove that there was no effect.2
Other courts have gone even further than Alcoa in expanding
the reach of the Sherman Act.23 For example in United States v.
National Lead Co.,24 several agreements were entered into among
foreign nondefendant corporations to, among other things, fix the
price of goods sold between their countries. National Lead, even
though not an actual party to the agreements, did encourage the
agreement, and thus was found to have violated the Sherman Act
because the agreements had the effect of helping National Lead by
tent to punish all whom its courts can catch, for conduct which has no conse-
quences within the United States. Id.
19 Id. Some commentators have questioned this statement. See, e.g., Zwarensteyn,
The Foreign Reach of the American Antitrust Laws, 3 AM. Bus L. J. 163, 173 (1965).
20 148 F.2d at 443.
21 Id. at 443-44.
22 It is well established in antitrust law that a person is presumed to intend the
natural consequences of his acts. See Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 175
U.S. 211, 243 (1899). Thus, in most cases, the defendant will have the burden of
proof that his acts had no effect on commerce; an almost impossible burden to meet.
This is especially true because Judge Hand, relying on Socony-Vacuum Oil Co. v. United
States, 310 U.S. 150 (1940), found a presumption that any restriction on production
has an influence on prices. Judge Hand was willing to do this even though Socony was
a case involving domestic commerce, and not foreign commerce. The result of using
the Socony presumption is that certain conduct can be proscribed without the required
actual effect on foreign commerce being shown. W. FUGATE, supra note 15, at 125-26.
23 See, e.g., United States v. General Electric, 82 F. Supp. 753 (D.N.J. 1949). In
his case, Philips, a Dutch corporation who did no business in the United States, was
found to have violated the Sherman Act because it was a party to foreign agreements
restricting the amount of electric lamps sold by these foreign corporations. General
Electric, although not a party to the agreement, encouraged the plan because it tended
to discourage the export of electric lamps to the United States by making the foreign
markets more attractive. The court first found that Philips knew or should have known
of General Elecric's illegal plan to dominate the United States incandescent lamp market,
and secondly, that Philips actions "dileteriously affected commerce" because "the agree-
ments with IGE and Corning... helped the General Electric plan of throttling potential
sources of foreign lamp parts." Id. at 891.
These proceedings caused strong diplomatic protests from the Dutch Government.
See Birrell, Extraterritorial Application of Antitrust Laws, in 3 INSTITUTE ON PRIVATE
INVESTMENTS ABROAD 145 (1961).
2463 F. Supp. 513 (S.D.N.Y. 1945).
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tending to restrict the amount of titanium pigments exported to the
United States. The court emphasized that National Lead was part
of a conspiracy which "was entered into, in the United States, to
restrain and control . . .commerce of the United States,"25 notwith-
standing the fact that it was not a party to the foreign agreements.
III. CURRENT TRENDS IN THE APPLICATION OF THE SHERMAN ACT
The mechanical approach of applying American antitrust stan-
dards to international situations, taken by most of the earlier cases
has been followed in subsequent decisions."' However, the courts
are continuing to expand the reach of the Sherman Act. For ex-
ample, in United States v. The Watchmakers of Switzerland,27 the
court found that a Swiss cartel agreement which, among other things,
restricted the importation of watch parts into the United States, had
a substantial effect on United States trade and commerce and con-
sequently was forbidden by the Sherman Act. The court rejected
a defense that it did not have jurisdiction because the antitrust laws
25 Id. at 524-25. The court, however, failed to explain how these agreements, which
did not restrict exports to the United States, had the effect of helping the National Lead
Company.
26 However, the Attorney General's National Committee to Study the Antitrust Laws,
after analyzing the cases, took a middle of the road approach. It concluded that:
(1) We feel that the Sherman Act applies only to those arrangements be-
tween Americans alone, or in concert with foreign firms, which have
such a substantial anticompetitive effect on this country's "trade or com-
merce ... with foreign nations" as to constitute unreasonable restraints.
(2) We believe that conspiracies between foreign competitors alone should
come within the Sherman Act only where they are intended to, and ac-
tually do, result in substantial anticompetitive effects on our foreign
commerce. ATT'Y GEN. NAT'L COMM. ANTrrRusT REP. 76 (1955)
[hereinafter cited as REPORT].
One committee member emphasized that "[slubstantial 'anticompetitive effects' referred
to here and elsewhere in the Report mean of course 'anticompetitive effects' which are
direct as well as substantial." Id. at n. 61.
While the approach taken by the REPORT is an improvement, it still presents some
problems. For one thing it fails to take into account the fundamental principle that
"the penal laws of a country have no extraterritorial force." 2 J. MOORE, A. DIGEST
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 236 (1906). See also J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE
CONFLICT OF LAWS 20-22 (7th ed. 1872); Carlston, Antitrust Policy Abroad, 49 Nw.
U. L. REV. 569, 578-80 (1954); Nitschke, The Antitrust Laws in Foreign Commerce,
53 MICH. L. REV. 1059, 1061 n. 10 (1955); Note, Extraterritorial Application of the
Antitrust Laws: A Conflict of Laws Approach, 70 YALE L. J. 259, 266 (1960). How-
ever the Attorney General's Report did recommend the "inclusion of 'safeguards' to
protect any defendent 'from being caught between the jaws of . . . any judgment and
the operations of law in foreign countries where it does its business.' " REPORT at 76
(footnote omitted). See, e.g., United States v. General Electric Co., 115 F. Supp. 835,
878 (D.N.J. 1953), where the court did give Philips, a Dutch corporation, immunity
from contempt should the judgment require acts forbidden by a foreign government.
27 1963 Trade Case 5 70,600 (S.D.N.Y.), modified, 1965 Trade Case 5 71,352
(S.D.N.Y. 1965).
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do not apply to the "acts of sovereign governments."2 The court
found that it had "jurisdiction as to acts and contracts abroad, if
.. . such acts and contracts have a substantial and material effect
upon our foreign and domestic commerce.""
The reach of the Sherman Act was further expanded in Pacific
Seafarers, Inc. v. Pacific Far East Line, Inc.3" This private treble
damage action was brought because the defendants, through rate
cutting, had eliminated the plaintiff as a possible competitor for
Agency for International Development (AID) shipments of ferti-
lizer and cement between Taiwan and South Vietnam. Even though
the goods were shipped from one foreign State to another, and noth-
ing was imported to or exported from the United States, the court
still found a violation of the Sherman Act. In doing so, the court
appeared to have abandoned the "effects test" of the Alcoa case, and
adopted an even broader "nexus test." The Pacific Seafarers court
stated that:
[T]he test which determines whether United States law is applica-
ble must focus on the nexus between the parties and their prac-
tices and the United States, not on the mechanical circumstances of
effect on commodity exports or imports.31
Under this test, if Americans engage in competitive practices which
are legal in the foreign State, but illegal if done in the United
28 In dictum the court noted that "If... the defendants' activities had been required
by Swiss law, this court could indeed do nothing. An American court would, under
such circumstances, have no right to condemn the governmental activity of another sov-
ereign nation." 1963 Trade Case at 77,456.
29 Id. at 77,457. Subsequent to the entry of judgment, the Swiss government "is-
sued official regulations with respect to the issuance of export permits for parts from
Switzerland." 1965 Trade Case at 80,492. Thus the court modified its earlier decree
to allow the defendants to comply with these rules and regulations. The court felt that
"these modifications will prevent any situation from arising such as has occurred in
other litigation in the past when there was believed to be a possible conflict between a
decree of a United States Court and the sovereignty of a foreign nation." 1965 Trade
Case at 80,493.
30 404 F.2d 804 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert denied, 393 U.S. 1093 (1969).
31 Id. at 815 (emphasis added). Specifically the court held that:
[Sjince there is an identifiable, distinctive market for American-flag shipping
service where the American characteristic is dominant - a market defined as
involving the transportation of AID-financed cargoes, which has a definite
nexus with significant interests of the United States - the Sherman Act is
applicable to a conspiracy to exclude newcomers from the trade. id. at 816
(footnote omitted).
The Pacific Seafarers case represents a major expansion of the result reached in Thomsen
v. Cayser, 243 U.S. 66 (1917). In this case, the Supreme Court found that the Sherman
Act was violated where the parties conspired to monopolize trade between the United
States and certain ports in Africa. Even though the agreement was not entered into in
the United States, the Court found that the agreement did have a substantial effect on
United States foreign commerce.
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States, then they will have violated the Sherman Act if there is a
"nexus between the parties and their practices and the United
States." 2 This would be the result even though there is "no direct
and substantial anticompetitive effects.' '3 In Pacific Seafarers, the
court partially justified its holding by emphasizing that only Ameri-
cans were involved, and "[c]onsequently there are few possible in-
ternational complications . . ."I' On the other hand, a lack of
international complications should not justify the application of the
Sherman Act unless there is a "substantial and material effect upon
our foreign and domestic commerce."3 6
Under the United States Constitution, Article I, Section 8, Con-
gress is given the authority to enact laws "to regulate Commerce
with foreign Nations, and among the several States...." Thus
the application of the Sherman Act to a situation not involving
United States "Commerce with foreign Nations" would be an un-
constitutional extension of the authority delegated to Congress. To
prevent the application of the Sherman Act in situations where
there is no effect on commerce, the Pacific Seafarers case must be
limited to its particular facts (the United States subsidizing its
merchant marine through AID), and even if this is done, the court
may have gone too far in view of the above limitations.
While in most areas the courts seem to be constantly expanding
the scope of the Sherman Act,3 7 several recent decisions have held
that the Act of State Doctrine and "compulsion" by foreign States
limit the application of the Act."8 In Occidental Petroleum Corp.
32 404 F.2d at 815.
33 See note 26 supra. Although theAlcoa case had expanded the reach of the Sher-
man Act, Judge Learned Hand, citing the American Banana case, still realized that "[w]e
should not impute to Congress an intent to punish all whom its courts can catch, for
conduct which has no consequences within the United States." 146 F.2d at 443.
34 148 F.2d at 443.
35 404 F.2d at 817.
36 United States v. The Watchmakers of Switzerland, 1963 Trade Case 70,600 at
77,457 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
37 See, e.g., Pacific Seafarers, Inc., v, Pacific Far East Lines, Inc., 404 F.2d 804 (D.C.
Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1093 (1969); United States v. The Watchmakers of
Switzerland, 1963 Trade Case 5 70,600 (S.D.N.Y. 1962), modified, 1965 Trade Case
5 71,352 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
38 Occidental Petroleum Corp. v. Buttes Gas & Oil Co., 331 F. Supp. 92 (C.D. Calif.
1971), appeal docketed, No. 71,1984, 9th Cir., June 24, 1971; Inter-American Refin-
ing Corp. v. Texaco Maracaibo, Inc., 307 F. Supp. 129,1 (D. Del. 1970) (appeal pend-
ing 3d Cir.). See also Note, International Law - Extraterritoriality - Antitrust Law
[-Dvelopment of the Defense of Sovereign Compulsion, 69 MIcH. L. REV. 888,
904-10 (1971).
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v. Buttes Gas & Oil Co.,"9 it was charged that the defendants had
conspired with several of the Trucial States, Great Britain and Iran
to deprive Occidental Petroleum of their richest offshore oil con-
cession. The court, noting that the facts in American Banana were
"strikingly similar to those now before the court,"4 held that under
the Act of State Doctrine,41 defendant's motion for summary judge-
ment would be granted, even though there was an effect on Ameri-
can commerce.42 The district court simply refused to examine the
acts of foreign sovereigns in conspiracy with the American defen-
dants or charges that international law had been violated.
The court in Interamerican Refining Corp. v. Texaco Maracaibo,
Inc., 43 concluded that because the Venezuelan regulatory authorities
compelled the defendants to boycott the plaintiffs, this compulsion
was a total defense to a charge that the antitrust laws had been
violated by an illegal boycott. They realized that in this situation,
"American business abroad does not carry with it the freedom and
protection of competition it enjoys here, and our courts cannot im-
pose them. '44  Furthermore, under the Act of State Doctrine, they
would not examine the legality of the Venezuelan official's acts.
Summary
It is safe to say that today the strict territorial approach of
American Banana is dead. This has been replaced by the objective
territorial principle as exemplified in the Alcoa case. Under this
approach, if the courts find some effect on foreign commerce with
the United States, then the Sherman Act is applicable. However,
the Pacific Seafarers court would apparently go even further and
find a violation of the Sherman Act if there were no effect on foreign
- United States commerce as long as the "nexus test" was satisfied.
a9 331 F. Supp. 92 (C.D. Calif. 1971), appeal docketed, No. 71,1984, 9th Cir.,
June 24, 1971. See also Recent Decision, 12 VA. J. INT'L L. 413 (1972).
40 Id. at 109. See notes 9-12 supra & accompanying text.
41 See note 12 supra.
42 331 F. Supp. at 102. But see Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon
Corp., 370 U.S. 690 (1962) where the Court stated:
To subject [the defendants] to liability under the Sherman Act for eliminating
a competitor from the Canadian market by exercise of the discretionary power
conferred upon Electro Met of Canada by the Canadian Government would
effectuate the purpose of the Sherman Act .... Id. at 707-08.
See also Fugate, supra note 13, at 934, where it was observed "that private parties are
ill-advised to rely upon permissive foreign laws to justify restraints upon United States
Commerce."
43 307 F. Supp. 1291 (D. Del. 1970) (appeal pending 3d Cir.).
44 Id. at 1298.
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On the other hand, if the defendant can establish that his "other-
wise illegal" conduct was compelled by a foreign State, then the
courts have declared that this is a valid defense to a Sherman Act
violation. But, these situations are not common and in most in-
stances the courts will apply the Sherman Act extraterritorially.
IV. CONFLICTING DECREES AND THE PRODUCTION OF
FOREIGN DOCUMENTS
Because of extraterritorial application of the Sherman Act, seri-
ous conflict of laws problems can and have arisen. For example,
in United States v. Imperial Chemical Indus.,45 the court found that
Imperial Chemical Industries (ICI) and DuPont had violated the
Sherman Act by, among other things, entering into agreements to
divide the world market relating to explosives and chemicals, thus
restricting United States foreign commerce. As part of the court's
decree, ICI, a British Corporation doing business in the United
States, was ordered to return DuPont's British patents which DuPont
had recently assigned to ICI. 46  Judge Ryan required the return of
the patents even though ICI had already granted an exclusive sub-
license to British Nylon Spanners (BNS), a British corporation
over whom the court did not have jurisdiction. Despite the lack of
jurisdiction over BNS Judge Ryan stated:
It does not seem presumptious for this court to make a direction
to a foreign defendant corporation over which it has jurisdiction
to take steps to remedy and correct a situation, which is unlawful
both here and in the foreign jurisdiction in which it is domiciled.
... It is not an intrusion on the authority of a foreign sovereign
for this court to direct that steps be taken to remove the harmful
effects on the trade of the United States. 47
45 100 F. Supp. 504 (S.D.N.Y. 1951), decree, 105 F. Supp. 215 (S.D.N.Y. 1952).
46 The court felt that DuPont had assigned the patents to ICI so as to remove them
from "the scope of any decree which might ultimately be made by [the] court." 105 F.
Supp. at 230.
47 Id. at 229. Even though the court stated that it was "unlawful" to restrict trade
into Britain (through the use of the patents ICI had obtained from DuPont), it appears
that this was not the case. In fact the court stated that "[w]e have been advised that
the present policy of British patent law is to foster manufacture in the United Kingdom
rather than to permit importation from abroad .... " Id. Thus, while it is unlawful to
restrict trade into the United States, this is not necessarily unlawful in Britain. See
Haight, supra note 6, at 645, where the author stated that: "It has long been established
in England that if the restraint has been imposed in good faith and for the protection
of legitimate trading interests it is lawful even though it may be harmful to third parties."
(footnote omitted). See also Note, The British Monopolies Act of 1948: A Contrast
with American Policy and Practice, 59 YALE L. J. 899, 917 (1950). This policy has
been continued in the Restrictive Trade Practices Act of 1956, 4 & 5 Eliz. 2, c 68.
1972]
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Judge Ryan also realized that BNS would probably bring an
action in Britain asking for specific performance of its contract with
ICI. However the court still did "not hesitate ...to decree that
the British nylon patents may not be asserted by ICI to prevent the
importation of nylon polymer .. . into Great Britain."48  Judge
Ryan felt that "the possibility that the English courts in an equity
suit will not give effect to such a provision in our decree should not
deter us from including it." 4
9
Judge Ryan's conjecture proved correct as BNS immediately
brought an action in Britain to prevent the enforcement of the dis-
trict court's decree and to compel specific performance.5" The
British Court of Appeals found itself "unable to agree with" Judge
Ryan's statement that it was not an intrusion on a foreign sover-
eign's authority for a United States court to require ICI to reassign
its patents.5 The court emphasized that the contract between ICI
and BNS was made in England between English nationals and was
to be performed there. Thus, the court refused to give effect to the
order of the United States court and allowed specific performance.52
The Chancery Division affirmed the Court of Appeals' judgment
pointing out that Judge Ryan had limited "his judgement [so] that
neither his judgement, nor any judgement of mine ...will disturb
the comity which the courts of the United States and the courts of
England are so anxious and careful to observe."53  The English
courts relied on a strict territorial principle of jurisdiction in reach-
ing their decisions. Furthermore, in view of the differing economic
policies of the two States, and Judge Ryan's inclusion in his decree
of an "escape clause" for ICI, 54 the English Court found that there
was little incentive to apply the "notion of comity."
48 105 F. Supp. at 231.
49 Id. The court took a "nothing ventured, nothing gained" approach when it rea-
soned that "[i]f the British courts were not to give credit to this provision, no injury
would have been done; if the holding of the British Courts were to the contrary, a rem-
edy available would not have been needlessly abandoned." Id.
50 British Nylon Spinners, Ltd. v. Imperial Chemical Indus., Ltd., [1952] 2 All
E.R. 780, made final, [1954) 3 All E.R. 88.
51 [1952] 2 All E.R. at 782.
52 Id. at 783-84. In closing the court noted that:
I do not conceive that I am offending in any way against the principles of
comity which apply between the two countries.... I take some comfort from
the doubts which the district judge himself entertained about the extent to
which his order might go, if carried to its logical conclusion. Id. at 784.
53 [1954] 3 All E.R. at 93.
54 No provision of this judgement shall operate against [the defendant com-
pany] for action taken in compliance with any law of the United States gov-
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Conflicts problems have also arisen when a United States court
requires the production of documents located in foreign States55 but
such production is prohibited by the local law of that State.5" Not
only can the nonproduction lead to a contempt action or a dismissal
of the suit, but also United States foreign relations may suffer.
For example, in In re Grand jury Investigation of the Shipping
Industry,57 the governments of Britain, Canada, Denmark, France,
Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway and Sweden pro-
tested the production of foreign business records which had been
ordered by a federal grand jury investigating possible antitrust
violations in the shipping industry. Even though the court found
that it had, "the power, authority and jurisdiction to require the
production of all the documents called for in all of the subpoenas
herein involved .... "" it realized that such objections should "be
ernment, or of any foreign government or instrumentality thereof, to which
[the defendant company) is at the time being subjected, and concerning mat-
ters over which, under the law of the United States, such foreign government
or instrumentality thereof has jurisdiction. Id. at 92. See also note 26, supra.
55 See W. FuGATE, supra note 15, at 76-85. Emmerglich, Antitrust Jurisdiction
and the Production of Documents Located Abroad, 11 RECORD OF N.Y.C.B.A. 122
(1956); Note, Subpoena of Documents Located in Foreign Jurisdictions, 37 N.Y.U. L.
REv. 295 (1962).
56 See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Subpoenas Duces Tecum Addressed to Canadian Int'l
Paper Co., 72 F. Supp. 1013 (S.D.N.Y. 1947), where a grand jury, investigating pos-
sible Sherman Act violations, required a Canadian Corporation, who did some business
in New York, to produce documents located in Canada. Since International Paper
was "found in New York," the court required production.
This action by the United States Court prompted the enactment of the Business
Records Protection Act of 1947, 11 Geo. 6, c.10, as amended, 14 Geo. 6, c.7 (1950),
1 ONTARIO REV. STAT. c. 44 (1960), which imposed one year's imprisonment and
contempt of court penalities on anyone removing unauthorized business records from
Ontario. See also Business Concerns Records Act of 1958, 6 & 7 Eliz. 2, c.42, QUE.
REv. STAT. c. 278 (1964).
The Netherlands, in section 39 of their Economic Competition Act of 1956, also
prohibits the production of documents to comply with foreign antitrust court orders.
The British have a similar statute with respect to their shipping industry. Shipping
Contracts and Commercial Documents Act of 1964, §§ 1,2, c.87.
57 186 F. Supp. 298, 318 (D. D. C. 1960).
58Id. at 317-18. A protest to the Secretary of State from the Netherlands reads,
in part:
The Netherlands Government ... emphasizes that it would lead to serious
conflicts of jurisdiction if a Government, with or without transgression of the
limits of international law, unilaterally institutes proceedings against foreign
companies engaged in activities, essentially falling within the jurisdiction of
their home countries.
Furthermore, the activities of the United States District Court are of such
a farreaching nature that they may unfavorably affect the interests of har-
monious international trade, especially if other States would take counter meas-
ures or would feel encouraged by the example of the United States to take
similar measures involving documentation outside their jurisdiction. Cited
in Haight, The Restrictive Business Clauses in United States Treaties: An
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given the greatest consideration."59 However, the court avoided any
serious conflicts problems by not requiring the production of foreign
documents at that time, finding that the investigation would not be
impeded if it reserved judgement.
Similarly, in In re Investigation of World Arrangements,6 ° the
district court was faced with objections by foreign States to the
grand jury's order for production of foreign documents in connec-
tion with antitrust violations in the petroleum industry. With re-
spect to foreign documents, whose production was prohibited by
foreign laws, the court stated that:
[T]he disclosure of documents is a procedural matter and it has
long been the rule that the "lex fori" governs the law of procedure.
However, substantive law may be affected in one jurisdiction when
procedural law operates in another, and this court does not particu-
larly desire to promulgate a "procedural" order imposing serious
criminal penalties under foreign substantive law.61
The court then refused to allow the production of documents
pending a showing by the movant of:
(1) A good faith endeavor to gain consent from the foreign
sovereign to remove the required documents;
(2) What, if any, interest the foreign sovereign has in the
movant corporation, or in the investigation; and
(3) Proof of the foreign law.6 2
For national security reasons, this grand jury, originally em-
paneled to consider the possibility of bringing indictments, was
terminated. Instead, the government brought an action in United
States v. Standard Oil Co.,63 against certain of the corporations
Antitrust Tranquilizer for International Trade, 70 YALE L. J. 240, 253 n.60
(1960).
59 186 F. Supp. at 318.
60 13 F.R.D. 280 (D.C.C. 1952).
61 1d. at 286. See also R. GRAVESON, THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 396 (4th ed.
1960); STUMBERG, PRINCIPLES OF CONFLICT OF LAWS 141-42 (2d ed. 1951).
But see Weinstein, Recognition in the United States of the Privileges of Another Juris-
diction, 56 COLUM. L. REv. 535 (1956).
62 13 F.R.D. at 288. As to the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company Ltd., the court did
find that it was "indistinguishable from the Government of Great Britain" because of
the British Navy's need for oil, thus sovereign immunity was granted. Id. at 291.
When the order was first made, the British government took the position that it was
contrary to international comity that British companies should be required to
produce documents which are not only not in the United States, but which
do not even relate to business in that country .... With regard to acts aris-
ing in this country, the normal view .. . would be that they should be inves-
tigated under British law .... Haight, Antitrust Laws and the Territorial
Principle, 11 VAND. L. REv. 27, 33 n. 19 (1957).
This position, taken by Great Britain, is typical of the positions taken by most States.
68323 F.R.D. 1 (S.D.N.Y. 1958).
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which initially had been investigated by the grand jury. As to the
production of foreign documents, the court required that a good
faith effort be made by the defendants to obtain the requisite in-
formation and should this fail, then they would not be penalized for
nonproduction. But should the government contest the defendant's
good faith efforts, then the court would hold a hearing to decide
what appropriate action should be taken.64.
However, when the non-production of documents will only result
in civil liabilities and economic hardship, contempt proceedings may
be instituted for the failure to produce documents. For example,
in United States v. First National City Bank,65 the court upheld a
civil contempt decree of $2,000 per day and 60 days imprisonment
because German documents, needed for an investigation of criminal
antitrust violations by the Bank's customers, were not produced.
The court strongly relied upon the Restatement (Second) of United
States Foreign Relations Law66 which provides that:
A state having jurisdiction to prescribe or to enforce a rule of law
is not precluded from exercising its jurisdiction solely because such
exercise requires a person to engage in conduct subjecting him to
liability under the law of another state having jurisdiction with
respect to that conduct.
When the court balanced the United States interest in investigating
possible antitrust violations,67 against potential business harm and
the "remote" chances that the defendant would suffer civil liabilities,
it held that the documents must be produced. In reaching this con-
clusion the court emphasized that the German statute, making it a
crime for certain types of people to disclose information, did not
specifically include banks. Furthermore, the German corporation,
to whom the documents related, was incorporated in New York.
Absent these special facts, it is questionable whether the court would
have required the documents to have been produced.
A similar argument, that potential civil liabilities from a breach
of contract would prevent a court from requiring action which would
cause such breach, was rejected by the Supreme Court in United
64 Id. at 4-5.
65 396 F.2d 897 (2d Cir. 1968).
6 6 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 39 (2d ed. 1965) [hereinafter cited as RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS
LAW]. However, section 39 is cross-referenced to section 40 which contains limitations
on the exercise of this type enforcement jurisdiction. See note 87 infra & accompany-
ing text.
67 The court observed that the antitrust laws "have long been considered corner-
stones of this nation's economic policies .... ." 396 F.2d at 903.
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States v. Holophane Co."8 In this case the lower court had required
the defendant to compete in certain European States, in which it had
contractually agreed that it would not. On appeal to the Supreme
Court, the defendant argued that it should not be required to breach
contracts which were valid in the foreign States. An equally divided
Court affirmed the lower court's order requiring the defendants to
compete. However, since the court was equally divided, this de-
cision is without precedent value. 9
Had one of the foreign parties to the contract sued for specific
performance, Holophane would have been in the same position as
ICI, and this time there would be no "escape provision" included
in the decree as there had been in the ICI case.7"
V. THE CURRENT JUSTICE DEPARTMENT VIEW OF THE
EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF THE SHERMAN ACT
It is clear that the Justice Department feels that the extrater-
ritorial application of the Sherman Act is necessary if United States
foreign commerce is to be protected. 71 However, it realizes that at
times international conflicts do arise when the antitrust laws are so
applied.72
In discussing the "possibility of conflict between U.S. and foreign
law", Mr. McLaren has stated that:
Although we may well have some very real problems to deal with
on this point, I think that the dimensions of the problem have been
substantially exaggerated.
To some extent, we are dealing not with outright conflict but
with problems of comity and communication between governments.
I think on occasion in the past we may have been remiss in failing
to explain, in advance, what action we proposed to take when it
affected the interest of other countries. We have learned from
these experiences. 73
In the past the United States antitrust policies have created hard
feelings with foreign States. This policy has led some States to
08119 F. Supp. 114 (S.D. Ohio 1954), aff'd per curiam, 352 U.S. 903 (1956).
6 9 See Ohio ex rel. Eaton v. Price 364 U.S. 263 (1960) (per curiam).
70 See note 54 supra.
71 See text accompanying note 1 supra.
72 One commentator has observed that "[w]hile at one time there were occasional
protests in foreign countries about United States antitrust actions, this is much less
true today because of a more common approach to antitrust enforcement and because
of machinery which has been set up to deal with possible conflicts." Address by
Fugate before the Int'l Conference on Nationalism and the Multi-National Enterprise,
McGill University, Montreal, Canada, Aug. 24, 1971.
73 McLaren, supra note 1.
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pass specific legislation preventing the production of documents
ordered by United States courts in antitrust cases.7 ' Also there have
been strong diplomatic protests from States whose nationals have
been involved in United States antitrust proceedings. 75  However,
the United States has responded to these complaints and recently has
instituted procedures to minimize these conflicts. Consequently the
United States and Canada now actively cooperate in reducing any
conflict problems through a system of joint notification. 7' The
Justice Department has also recently instituted a "Business Review
Procedure" whereby a businessman can receive a business review
letter regarding the legality of proposed activities which might
"harm" United States foreign commerce. 77
The Justice Department's approach is that conflicts problems can
be largely reduced through communication at both the individual
and State levels. While this does not solve the "theoretical" conflict
of laws and international law problems, from a practical standpoint
it seems to be working quite well. Compared to the past there have
been relatively few actions where the government has utilized the
Sherman Act extraterritorially.78 In fact, recently it has been mainly
in the private treble damage area where most of the cases have oc-
curred.
VI. LIMITATIONS ON THE EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION
OF THE SHERMAN ACT
A. Limitation on the Power of a State to Prescribe Legislation
Even though the Antitrust laws are well established in the
74 See note 56 supra.
7r See note 58 supra.
76 Canada-U.S. Antitrust Corporation 5 CCH TRADE REG. REP. 5 50,112 (1972).
7 7 Antitrust and Foreign Commerce 5 CCH TRADE REG. REP. 50,129 (1972).
See also Memorandum of the Department of Justice Concerning Antitrust and Foreign
Commerce, where the antitrust implications of 12 examples involving foreign commerce
are examined. Id. at 55,208-212.
Specifically, Richard McLaren has suggested that a concerned businessman:
First, consult qualified antitrust counsel; I feel certain that competent advice
can solve most of the problems that will arise. And, second, before a firm
assumes that it can justify activities which violate American antitrust law
on the grounds of foreign compulsion, counsel should consult with either
the Antitrust Division or the Department of State, and preferably both, be-
fore proceeding. McLaren, supra note 1.
78 Between 19,37 and 1943 over 50 cases were brought by the Antitrust Division.
Birrell, Extraterritorial Application of Antitrust Laws, in 3 INSTITUTE ON PRIVATE
INVESTMENTS ABROAD 133 (1961). See also Wall St. J. April 24, 1972, at 1, col.
6, where it is suggested that if Richard Nixon is reelected, then the United States will
continue to relax the strict enforcement of antitrust policies against domestic corpora-
tions operating abroad.
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United States, 9 "[t]here is but little question that the American
antitrust laws contain little if any generally accepted principles of
law recognized by the international community of civilized na-
tions. ' 18  In many States, the government encourages or requires
participation in such activities as price fixing or market division,
activities which are considered per se anticompetitive and thus illegal
under United States standards.81 This fact must be kept in mind
when one considers the language of the Sherman Act; "trade or
commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations."
Whether Congress intended that this language should have extra-
territorial application is no longer important. It is clear that the
courts have and will probably continue to give such application to
the Sherman Act. The Restatement (Second) of United States For-
eign Relations Law seems to support this type of application, but
only if certain conditions are met. Specifically, section 18 states that:
A state has jurisdiction to prescribe a rule of law attaching legal
consequences to conduct that occurs outside its territory and causes
an effect within its territory, if either
(a) the conduct and its effect are generally recognized as constitu-
ent elements of a crime or tort under the laws of states that
have reasonably developed legal systems, or
(b) (i) the conduct and its effect are constituent elements of ac-
tivity to which the rule applies; (ii) the effect within the
territory is substantial; (iii) it occurs as a direct and fore-
seeable result of the conduct outside the territory; and (iv)
the rule is not inconsistent with the principles of justice gen-
erally recognized by states that have reasonably developed
legal systems. 82
Since the United States concept of economic regulation is not gen-
erally recognized by most States, the United States cannot justify
extraterritorial application under Section 18 (a) of the Restatement.
79 See, e.g., Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344, 359 (i933)
(Sherman Act is charter of freedom for all trade). See also F. KAYSEN AND D. TURNER,
ANTITRUST POLICY 11 (1959).
80 Zwarensteyn, supra note 19, at 177. See also Haight, supra note 6, at 644.
[Vliolations of Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act do not fall within any
category of crimes which are common to such community [of civilized na-
tions]; they are offenses created by Congress for the purpose of better regulat-
ing commerce between the states and with foreign nations, and they express
the public policy of the United States on American trade and the American
economy. Not even such a policy, let alone the "crime" itself, is common to
other civilized societies.
8 1See, e.g., United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940) (price
fixing); Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593 (1951) (allocation
of trade territories); United States v. The Watchmakers of Switzerland, 1963 Trade
Case 5 70,600, at 77,414 (S.D.N.Y. 1962) (group boycott and price fixing).
8 2 RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAw § 18.
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However, under section 18 (b) (iv) such application could be justi-
fied because United States economic regulations are "not inconsistent
with the principles" which other States recognize."3 Thus, assuming
that the other three requirements of section 18 (b) are met, the
United States, without violating international law,84 has jurisdiction
to proscribe certain "foreign" acts which have effects within the
territory.
B. Limitations on the Power of a State to Enforce Legislation
If the United States is justified, under certain circumstances, in
enacting antitrust legislation which can be applied extraterritorially,
the limitations in the application of this legislation must be defined.
Judge Learned Hand, in the Alcoa case, noted that these limitations
"correspond to those fixed by the 'Conflict of Laws.' " The Re-
statement Second of Conflicts, in section 50, allows a State
to exercise judicial jurisdiction over a foreign corporation which
causes effects in the state by an act done elsewhere with respect to
any cause of action arising from these effects unless the nature of
these effects and of the corporation's relationship to the state makes
the exercise of such jurisdiction unreasonable. 8
From a conflicts standpoint, jurisdiction can be exercised unless to
do so would be unreasonable. The problem is, when would it be
unreasonable? This question can be answered, in part, by looking
to section 40 of The Restatement of Foreign Relations Law which
lists the following factors which States are required by international
law to consider before they exercise their power of enforcement:
(a) Vital national interests of each of the states,
(b) the extent and nature of the hardship that inconsistant
enforcement actions would impose upon the person,
(c) the extent to which the required conduct is to take place
in the territory of the other state,
(d) the nationality of the person, and
(e) the extent to which enforcement by action of either state
can reasonably be expected to achieve compliance with the rules
prescribed by that state.87
83 See notes 4-7 supra & accompanying text.
84 As the court in Pacific Seafarers, Inc. v. Pacific Far East Line, Inc., 404 F.2d 804,
814 (D.C. Cir. 1968), noted, "it may fairly be inferred, in the absence of clear show-
ing to the contrary, that Congress did not intend an application [of the Sherman Act)
that would violate principles of international law."
85 148 F.2d at 443 (emphasis added).
86 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 50 (1971). See atso
section 37 with respect to jurisdiction over individuals.
8 7 RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONs LAW § 40. See also A. vON MEHREN
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In addition to the above extrinsic limitations, United States
courts should also consider the following limitations which result
from the intrinsic nature of the Sherman Act before they hold for-
eigners liable. First, "the Sherman Act offense is complex, and it
is usually difficult to establish the relationship of cause and effect.
...[f]oreigners may find themselves charged in the United States
with a criminal offense which they could hardly have been expected
to foresee or to understand." '88 Consequently, unless the foreigner
knowingly intended to cause a direct, foreseeable and substantial
effect on United States commerce, the courts should be reluctant to
hold him liable.89 Second, the Sherman Act is intrinsically vague
and uncertain. As one commentator has observed:
To the foreigner it would be an intolerable burden to require him
or his lawyer to understand the intricacies of the case law under
the antitrust statutes, to prognosticate whether the rule of reason
applied to his activities in his own country or that what he did was
a per se violation; and if the rule of reason did apply, to forecast
the mental processes of an American judge educated and living in
a political and economic climate fundamentally different from his
own. By its very nature this type of legislation is replete with un-
certainty and unsuited to extraterritorial application. 9o0
Not only should the inherent vagueness and lack of cause and
effect which is present in the Sherman Act cause the courts to be
reluctant in applying it to a foreigner, but also a basically different
standard should be applied if extraterritorial jurisdiction is exercised.
First, a higher standard of "effect on commerce" is implied from the
wording of the statute itself. The Constitution makes a distinction
between commerce "among" the states and commerce "with" foreign
& D. TRAuTMAN, THE LAWS OF MULTISTATE PROBLEMS, 376 (1965) where the
authors observed that:
Frequently conflicts between the regulating rules of two concerned jurisdic-
tions can rationally be resolved by examining the strength of the domestic-law
and multijurisdictional policies that lead each concerned jurisdiction to select
its regulating rule.
In the situation where the conflicts are irreducible, the better view is that the transac-
tion should be upheld. See id. at 406-08.
8 8 Haight, supra note 9, at 648-49. See also RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELA-
TIONS LAW § 18(b) (iii).
89 Something more than the traditional antitrust "intent" notions should be neces-
sary if this requirement is to be truly meaningful. See note 22 supra.
90 Haight, supra note 6, at 649. When the Sherman Act was passed almost 82
years ago, few if any of the congressmen could have foreseen how this Act would evolve
to prohibit the wide variety of conduct, whose prohibition is taken for granted today.
However, with the newly established Business Review Procedure, a foreign businessman
can find out whether the Justice Department thinks his activities will violate the United
States antitrust laws. See note 77 supra.
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nations, which distinction is carried over into the Sherman Act."
Secondly, where the foreign action involves conduct which would be
a per se violation under American standards of the antitrust laws,92
American courts should not automatically treat this foreign conduct
as a per se violation. Just because price fixing in the United States
is a per se violation does not mean that price fixing in Central Africa
should also be treated in the same way. Professor Areeda has
emphasized "that domestic per se rules cannot be automatically
transposed to international conduct affecting American exports." 3
Courts should not take the simpler per se approach just because it
is easier than applying the "rule of reason" approach to a complex
international scheme. While in the past the Justice Department has
been unwilling to consider the "rule of reason" in these circum-
stances, this view has apparently now changed.9 4
If the above two step analysis95 is combined with a provision in
91 One commentator has noted that
[a) fair construction of the English language might reasonably support a
holding that there is a wider compulsion in the power to regulate what
occurs "among" domestic sovereignties than there is to regulate what occurs
"with" foreign nations. Whitney, Sources of Conflict Between International
Law and the Antitrust Laws, 63 YALE L. J. 655, 660-62 (1954).
9 2 See note 81 supra.
93 P. AREEDA, ANTITRUST ANALYSIS 68 (1967). But see Katzenbach, Conflicts on
an Unruly Horse: Reciprocal Claims and Tolerances in Interstate and International
Law, 65 YALE L. J. 1087, 1152 n. 231 (1965), where the author stated that:
I would concede that there may be circumstances where a company is so
economically squeezed by conflicting national policies that there may be no
practical alternative which does not violate the law of one of the countries
involved. But to retract all the way to a "rule of reason" for territorial division
of markets, price-fixing, and other of the more heinous "per se" offenses
seems to open wide the gates.
Another commentator feels that foreign per se antitrust offenses should be the prime
target for attack. See Fortenberry, Jurisdiction over Extraterritorial Antitrust Violations
- Paths through the Great Grimpen Mire, 32 OHIO ST. L. J. 519, 520-21 (1971).
This was also the position that the Chief of the Foreign Commerce Section of the Justice
Department has taken.
The Justice Department with the advice of the State Department, attempts
to give due regard to comity with other nations in antitrust enforcement,
within the bounds of discretion permitted under our laws. Of course, such
principles are not applicable to per se offenses where United States jurisdiction
is clear. Address by Fugate before the 93d annual meeting of the American
Bar Ass'n., St. Louis, Mo. Aug. 10, 1970. Since then the Justice Department
has apparently changed its mind and is now willing to consider the rule of
reason when deciding whether a particular type of conduct violates the antitrust
laws. See Antitrust and Foreign Commerce, 5 CCH TRADE REG. REP.
50,129 at 55,207 (1972).
94 See note 93 supra.
95 First, the court should consider the four limitations on the power to prescribe
found in section 18 of the Restatement of Foreign Relations Law. Second, the courts
should consider the extrinsic limitations on the power to enforce found in section 40 of
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a decree which would exempt the defendant from liability where
direct conflicts arise because of foreign decree or laws,9" then any
conflict of laws problems arising from the extraterritorial applica-
tion of the Sherman Act would be largely eliminated.
VII. CONCLUSION
With the possible exception of the American Banana case9 7 no
court has used a conflict of laws approach in deciding whether the
Sherman Act should be applied extraterritorially. While some
courts say that their actions do not violate international law, in the
final analysis American domestic standards are applied, not those
of international law.
Although some commentators have proposed ways that conflict
of laws principles could be applied to the extraterritorial application
of the Sherman Act, 8 no court has indicated that it would be willing
to follow them.9 The courts thus far have chosen to proscribe for-
the Restatement of Foreign Relations Law and also those which are intrinsic to the
Sherman Act.
16 See note 26 supra.
97 See text accompanying notes 10-12 supra.
98 See Zwarensteyn, supra note 19, at 171, where the author suggests that the
courts should
First, view the case from the substantive law angle, or rather from the angle
of the remedy sought: if the remedy sought is damages, then, the action will
be classified as one sounding in tort, and the choice of law is determined
accordingly. Conversely, if the remedy sought is punishment, then, the action
being punitive in nature, will be classified as a criminal action, and the
problems connected with the applicable choice of law will be determined
accordingly.
See also E. RABEL, THE CONFLICTS OF LAWS 71 (2d ed. 1958).
Another commentator has condensed the approaches of Professors Falk, Baxter,
Mehren, Trautman and Leflar in an attempt to find a conflict of laws theory which the
court can use. See Fortenberry, supra note 93, at 540-544. See also Trautman, The Role
of Conflicts Thinking in Defining the International Reach of American Regulatory
Legislation, 22 OHIO ST. L. J. 586 (1961).
99 There is no simple, neat, formalistic solution to the conflict of laws problems
which arise with the extraterritorial application of the Sherman Act. See E. CHEATHAM,
H. GOODRICH, E. GRISWOLD & W. REESE, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONFLICTS
OF LAWS 8 (2d ed. 1941) where the authors stated:
[T]here was a long tendency to look for simple and farreaching ideas, which
could dominate and give direction in the whole field. Story purposed to find
it in sovereignty.... In recent years there has been a growing realization by
the courts as well as by the writers that conflict of laws - extending as it does
over the whole field of private law - cannot usefully be compressed into a few
simple ideas or principles .... See also Cook, The Jurisdiction of Sovereign
States and the Conflict of Laws, 31 COLUM. L. REV. 368 (1931); Lorenzen,
Territoriality, Public Policy and the Conflict of Laws, 33 YALE L. J. 736
(1924). The solution, if there is one, lies in the courts appreciation of the
rationale for such application combined with a balancing of the factors dis-
cussed in section VI.
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eign conduct even where the effect on United States commerce is
questionable. They have taken the approach that American trade
regulation policies should be enforced to the utmost, even when the
economic effects are minimal. If national complications do arise,
the courts reason that the scope of such regulation can be cut back.
After all, nothing ventured, nothing gained."" Few, if any, courts
will follow a conflicts approach which eliminates the "effect" test.
It is hoped that the two stage analysis developed in section VI will
aid the courts in determining what circumstances and factors should
be examined before they will apply the Sherman Act extraterri-
torially.
LAWRENCE WILLIAM NELSON, SR.
100 See note 49 supra.
